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___________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
MANSMANN,  Circuit Judge. 
 The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania brings this appeal 
from an order of the district court granting a Petition for Writ 
of Habeas Corpus, filed by David Lee Yohn, a state prisoner 
currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at 
Huntington, Pennsylvania.  The Commonwealth contends that Yohn is 
not entitled to habeas relief because no constitutional error 
occurred when the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania became involved in a trial court ruling on the 
admissibility of evidence.   
 We find that the district court did not err in holding 
that the ex parte involvement of the Chief Justice in the 
criminal trial violated Yohn's right to procedural due process 
under the fourteenth amendment, and his right to a fair trial 
under the sixth amendment.  We further find that this violation 
did not constitute harmless error under the standard set forth in 
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946).   
 Therefore, we will affirm the order of the district 
court granting the writ of habeas corpus.  We do not, however, 
find any authority for the federal district court to order the 
exclusion of the wiretap evidence upon retrial.  Therefore, we 
will vacate the order of the district court to the extent that it 
directs that the wiretap evidence be excluded and leave that 
ruling to the state court upon retrial.           
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I.   
 The relevant facts are not disputed.   On January 23, 
1985, Andrew Kollar was shot and killed by a single shotgun blast 
outside his home in Old Zionsville, Lehigh County, Pennsylvania. 
During its investigation of the incident, the Pennsylvania State 
Police questioned Gerald Southerland, an individual who reputedly 
had prior drug dealings with Kollar.  Southerland initially 
denied any knowledge or involvement in Kollar's murder.   
 Later, accompanied by his attorney, Southerland 
implicated David Lee Yohn and Donald Lynn as accomplices in an 
unsuccessful robbery scheme.  According to Southerland, since 
Kollar did not know Lynn, Lynn was recruited to gain entry into 
Kollar's house under the guise of car trouble.  Lynn was to 
restrain Kollar at gunpoint while Southerland and Yohn entered 
the house and searched for money.  Although Lynn successfully 
gained entry into Kollar's home, the plan went awry and Kollar, 
attempting to escape, was shot in the back.  Southerland 
identified Yohn as the shooter. 
 In exchange for this information and his later 
cooperation as a prosecution witness, state authorities agreed to 
charge Southerland only with burglary and permitted him to remain 
free on his own recognizance.  In addition, the deal was 
conditioned upon the accuracy of Southerland's role in the 
incident as the "wheelman" and his continued cooperation to 
assist the prosecution in obtaining evidence which implicated his 
4 
co-conspirators.  To accomplish this, Southerland agreed to wear 
a body wire and to meet with Yohn. 
 On March 15, 1985, Southerland was wired with a reel-
to-reel tape recorder and transmitter in anticipation of meeting 
with Yohn.0  Later that day, when Southerland met with Yohn, 
state police attempted to record their conversation as they 
travelled to various locations in and around Lehigh County. State 
police monitored these conversations from a van outfitted with 
receiving and recording equipment.0  Yohn and Lynn were 
subsequently arrested and charged with murder, robbery, burglary, 
criminal trespass, crimes committed with firearms, and criminal 
conspiracy.0 
 Yohn filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the tape of 
the wiretap conversation on constitutional and other procedural 
grounds.  This motion was denied by a common pleas judge in an 
order and opinion filed on September 10, 1985. 
 Immediately preceding the commencement of voir dire on 
October 21, 1985, the defense made an oral motion in limine 
                                                           
0
 The reel-to-reel recorder was the primary device relied 
upon by the state police to record any statements made by Yohn. 
The transmitter allowed the police to overhear the conversation 
in addition to serving as a back up for the reel-to-reel 
recorder. 
0
 The reel-to-reel recorder failed to record any of the 
conversation and only fragments of their conversation were 
received and recorded from the transmitter. 
0
 Lynn provided a written statement on March 15, 1985 
implicating himself, Yohn and Southerland.  Three days later, 
Lynn issued a subsequent statement to the police from prison in 
which he claimed to have seen Yohn holding the shotgun 
immediately after Kollar was shot.  In return for his cooperation 
and trial testimony, the Commonwealth agreed to accept his pleas 
of guilty to third degree murder and attempted burglary. 
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requesting a ruling from the trial court concerning the 
admissibility of the tape recording of the wiretap or, in the 
alternative, a ruling which precluded the prosecution from 
referring to the tape during voir dire and opening statement 
until the trial court had ruled on its admissibility.  The court 
then held an in camera hearing during which the judge sat in the 
jury box and listened to the tape while reading a transcript of 
the recorded conversation prepared by a secretary in the District 
Attorney's office.0  The court deferred any ruling until the next 
morning to enable the court stenographer to submit his rendition 
of the taped conversation as another means of evaluating the 
tape's clarity and comprehension. 
 The next morning, on October 22, 1985, the judge heard 
arguments in chambers and overruled the defense objection to the 
statements obtained through the use of the wiretap, but indicated 
that a satisfactory transcript still needed to be derived.  Jury 
selection then commenced, and during voir dire, counsel for the 
Commonwealth, as well as for Yohn, questioned potential jurors 
                                                           
0
 The tape was approximately thirty minutes long with 
less than two minutes questionably audible.  Certain words and 
parts of sentences were audible, but there were numerous gaps 
between words and sentences.  Defense counsel argued that these 
gaps made the fragmented audible portion virtually 
incomprehensible and unintelligible, resulting in the entire tape 
being untrustworthy and inadmissible as evidence. 
 
 The prosecution conceded that large portions of the 
tape were inaudible, but contended that one or two minutes of 
conversation were sufficiently clear so that the jury could 
understand.  The prosecutor argued that in order to facilitate 
understanding and permit the jury to follow the tape with a 
minimum of difficulty, the court, prosecution and defense should 
collectively derive a transcript to be provided to the jury. 
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regarding how they felt about the police obtaining and using 
wiretap evidence.  Counsel for Yohn inquired as to whether they 
would have any objection to wiretap evidence "if it was garbled, 
full of problems, inaudible, and very difficult to hear."     
 Before jury selection continued on the next day, 
defense counsel asked the court for a clarification of its ruling 
regarding the admissibility of the tape.  Yohn acknowledged that 
the court's ruling permitted the prosecution to question 
potential jurors about wiretap evidence; he was uncertain whether 
the court ruled that the tape would be admissible at trial.  Yohn 
further argued that if the court had ruled the tape admissible, 
it was obligated to make findings of fact on the record as 
required by Commonwealth v. Leveille, 289 Pa. Super. 248, 433 
A.2d 50 (1981).  Yohn also raised the issue of the court's 
previous dissatisfaction with the transcript.   
 In response, the trial judge stated that he agreed 
"that there is more to be resolved in respect to the tape".   The 
court held that the prosecutor would be permitted to continue 
referring to the tape during voir dire, and that the 
admissibility issue would be addressed after jury selection.  
 Trial commenced without any further discussions of, or 
rulings on, the admissibility of the tape recording.  In his 
opening statement, the prosecutor explained the tape of the 
wiretap, how it was made and what it would be used to prove.  The 
prosecutor gave his own interpretation of the contents of the 
tape, telling the jury that the tape would show that Yohn 
incriminated himself as to the crimes charged.   
7 
 Defense counsel also devoted a portion of his opening 
statement to the tape recording, advising the jurors that, if 
permitted to hear the tape, they would discover that nearly all 
of the recorded conversation was inaudible.  Defense counsel 
explained that the entire wiretap conversation was not 
sufficiently audible to permit the jury to know what was said or 
what was intended to be said by the entire conversation.  Of the 
minute or so of barely audible conversation, there were gaps in 
the sentences so words were left dangling and the jury would not 
hear the entire sentences.  Defense counsel opined that it was 
the jurors' responsibility to determine what was said on the 
tape, not what the prosecutor asserted was on the tape.  Further, 
he told them Yohn had an explanation for the words consistent 
with his innocence.  
 On October 30, 1985, the Commonwealth called Trooper 
Robert Gerkin to the stand to testify to his observations of the 
wiretap conversation.  At that point, the judge decided to take 
up the issue of the admissibility of the tape, retired the jury,0 
and ordered another in camera hearing so a final ruling could be 
made.  The prosecutor expressed his belief that a ruling on 
admissibility had already been made, and that the only 
outstanding issue was the preparation of a transcript.  To this, 
the judge replied: 
the transcript bothers me very much and 
initially, given the question to decide, I 
agree I may have made a preliminary ruling. 
                                                           
0
 Before retiring the jurors, the judge told them that 
the court had a very important issue to resolve and that it was 
going to take some time. 
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But it has always bothered me and I think I 
should give it a more thorough consideration. 
I have real problems with it to be honest 
with you as to whether this new transcription 
is going to help.  
 
 Using more sophisticated audio equipment than during 
the hearing on the initial motion in limine, the Commonwealth 
again played the tape while the judge sat in the jury box with a 
court stenographer.  The thirty minute tape was played in its 
entirety and the judge did not have a transcript.  The two minute 
segment that the prosecutor proposed to introduce was then 
replayed while the judge read the transcript prepared by the 
prosecutor.  After hearing argument, the judge stated on the 
record that he found the tape to be inaudible when hearing it 
without the transcript, and was of such poor quality that it 
would lead to jury speculation as to its contents.  Further, the 
trial judge referred to the tape as an "absolute absurdity" and 
as "absolutely prejudicial".  The judge granted Yohn's motion to 
exclude the tape recording. 
 When the trial reconvened the next day, the 
Commonwealth recalled Trooper Gerken to the stand.  Trooper 
Gerken was the Pennsylvania state police officer who was 
listening to the wiretap conversation and taking notes as it was 
being recorded.  On offer of proof, the Commonwealth stated that 
Trooper Gerken would testify to what he heard and the notes he 
recorded while listening to this conversation.  Defense counsel 
objected to such testimony, arguing that Trooper Gerken's 
testimony could not be more reliable that the tape recording 
9 
because he had listened to the conversation through the recording 
equipment.  The judge sustained the objection, ruling that the 
testimony would have "the same prejudicial effect" as the tape. 
This argument and ruling took place at a sidebar conference. 
 Still at sidebar, the prosecutor requested a 
continuance, stating that he would seek a writ of prohibition 
from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.  The court denied the 
request for a continuance and instructed the parties to proceed. 
In open court, the prosecutor then requested a fifteen minute 
recess.  The judge called counsel back to sidebar, where the 
prosecutor further strongly expressed his disagreement, prompting 
the judge to grant the requested recess.0 
                                                           
0
 MR. MAKOUL: Your Honor -- 
 
 THE COURT: This is the trial ruling and let's go. 
 
 MR. McINTYRE: We are asking for a recess. 
 
 THE COURT: So you are. 
 
 MR. McINTYRE: You have to hold me in contempt because 
I will get a Writ of Prohibition filed 
right now. 
 
 THE COURT: I'm not going to hold you in contempt. 
 
 MR. McINTYRE: You have to.  I'm getting a Writ of 
Prohibition. 
 
 THE COURT: Don't get so excited.  We have a trial 
ruling. 
 
 MR. McINTYRE: You lose most. 
 
 THE COURT: What? 
 
 MR. McINTYRE: You heard me. 
 
 THE COURT: What? 
10 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
 MR. McINTYRE: I said you lose them most. 
 
 THE COURT: I stand on my trial ruling on this, Mr. 
McIntyre. 
 
 MR. McINTYRE: I'm asking for a recess.  I think we 
should be allowed the opportunity to 
have a recess.  I want to talk to Bill 
Platt and decide what we are going to 
do. 
 
Sometimes you just can't take what you 
have done to us in this case. 
 
 THE COURT: Mr. McIntyre, don't talk so silly.  That 
tape was an absolute absurdity. 
 
 MR. McINTYRE: A witness can't testify to what he 
heard? 
 
 THE COURT: It has the same prejudicial effect in 
coming across in bits and pieces in the 
tape.  I saw his transcript.  It didn't 
convince me anymore than that.  He would 
have the same prejudicial effect of 
taking parts of sentences which were 
inaudible and had gaps in them and 
everything else.  That has the same 
prejudicial effect. 
 
 MR. McINTYRE: I see in every case where a witness 
testifies as to a conversation he 
overhears.  He has to overhear every 
word; is that your opinion? 
 
 MR. MAKOUL: Your Honor -- 
 
 MR. McINTYRE: Can we research this issue, Judge? 
 
 THE COURT: That's not my opinion. 
 
 MR. MAKOUL: The Court has made a ruling.  This is 
clearly improper. 
 
 MR. McINTYRE: And the Court made lots of rulings which 
it changed its mind on.  I'm asking for 
a recess to get research to you, Judge. 
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 MR. MAKOUL: Your Honor, I'm sorry to hear him carry 
on like this. 
 
 MR. McINTYRE: I'm sorry to hear you carry on too. 
 
 MR. MAKOUL: Let's proceed with the trial.  I think 
that's my client's right. 
 
 MR. McINTYRE: That's what I asked when you asked to 
have him reverse himself, let's proceed 
with the trial.  Now I'm asking for a 
recess to either do that or get research 
to you because, Judge, it's outlandish 
to say this man can't testify to what he 
heard. 
 
 MR. MAKOUL: I object to that kind of bullying and 
intimidation to the Court.  That's 
outrageous. 
 
 THE COURT: All right.  We will give you a recess. 
 
 MR. McINTYRE: Thank you, Judge. 
 
MR. MAKOUL: May I ask what for, the purpose or 
reason? 
 
MR. McINTYRE: I don't think I have to tell you.  I 
stated it on the record. 
 
 MR. MAKOUL: I would like to know. 
 
 MR. McINTYRE: I'm not stating anything to you. 
 
 THE COURT: I don't think he has to let me know.  He 
wants the Court to extend him that 
privilege and I am.  I'll extend it. 
 
I think you are overreacting, Mr. 
McIntyre.  You have a coconspirator that 
testified.  You got your tape.  The tape 
was absolutely prejudicial. 
 
 MR. McINTYRE: Later on I'll tell you what I think of 
you in this case. 
 
 MR. MAKOUL: I don't believe this. 
 
 THE COURT: I don't either. 
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 After the recess, the prosecutor informed the court at 
sidebar that he had placed a call to the chambers of Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court Chief Justice Robert N.C. Nix and had reached a law 
clerk.  The law clerk advised the prosecutor that the Chief 
Justice was in conference, but would attempt to contact the trial 
judge when the conference was concluded.  The prosecutor 
requested a continuance until he was able to speak with the Chief 
Justice.  The request was denied. 
 The court then granted the Commonwealth's request for 
an instruction to the jury regarding the exclusion of the tape, 
informing the jury that he had ordered the tape excluded after 
originally ruling that it was admissible, and that the jurors 
were not to believe that the Commonwealth intended to mislead 
them by referring to the tape in opening statement.0  Upon 
request of defense counsel, the court also instructed the jurors 
that they were not to draw any adverse inferences against Yohn 
from the fact that they knew a wiretap had occurred.  After 
questioning one additional witness, the Commonwealth rested. 
 Defense counsel was in the process of questioning his 
first witness when the court announced, "Something has come up" 
and the court recessed until after lunch.  The judge had been 
                                                           
0
 The judge told the jury that when he recessed the court 
early the previous day, he did so in order to consider the 
admissibility of the tape of the wiretap conversation between 
Southerland and Yohn.  He told them that defense counsel objected 
to admitting the tape because it was inaudible and difficult to 
understand.  The court told the jury that before the trial 
started he had ruled the tape admissible, but after listening to 
it again on more sophisticated equipment, both with and without a 
transcript, he determined that the tape was not admissible. 
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notified that the Chief Justice was calling his chambers in 
response to the telephone call placed earlier by the prosecutor. 
 The trial judge, the prosecutor and defense counsel 
proceeded to the trial judge's chambers.0  The judge and the 
prosecutor spoke with the Chief Justice on the only two available 
telephones.  Defense counsel did not participate in the 
conversation.0  He was standing next to the prosecutor, but was 
not able to hear any of the Chief Justice's remarks. 
 The Chief Justice asked the prosecutor to relate what 
had prompted the call placed to his chambers.  The prosecutor 
explained the background regarding the exclusion of the tape, and 
the trial judge agreed that the facts as set forth by the 
prosecutor were essentially correct.  The tape was not played for 
the Chief Justice.  At this point, the Chief Justice began 
speaking to the trial judge.  After this conversation concluded, 
the trial judge told counsel for both parties that he was going 
to allow the tape to be played for the jury.0 
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 The proceedings in chambers were not made part of the 
record. 
0
 Defense counsel asserts in his brief and at oral 
argument that he believed that the topic of the conversation was 
the Commonwealth's request for a stay to file a writ of 
prohibition, and therefore, did not feel it was necessary to 
participate at this point.  At oral argument before us, defense 
counsel stated that he could not have participated in the 
telephone call had he so desired because the prosecutor was so 
engrossed in his conversation with the Chief Justice that defense 
counsel would literally have had to wrestle him to the floor to 
get the phone. 
0
 Defense counsel alleges in his brief that, over the 
noon recess, he unsuccessfully attempted to contact the Chief 
Justice for an explanation of the Chief Justice's authority to 
intervene in a discretionary ruling of the trial court.  Defense 
counsel further asserts that on November 1, 1985, he was able to 
14 
 When court resumed, the judge stated on the record at a 
sidebar conference "that [at] approximately 20 of 12:00 I 
received a call from the Chief Justice relative to this case who 
said to me that regardless of my ruling in respect to the tape 
that I should defer that ruling and frame the issue and allow the 
tape to be played.  This I'm sure was a directive from him which 
the court will abide by."  Defense counsel objected, arguing that 
he had never been apprised of what had transpired with regard to 
the Chief Justice's intervention.  The prosecutor related his 
actions for the record:  "I gave [the law clerk] my version of 
the fact that we had a pre-trial ruling which permitted me to use 
the tape and transcript, that I relied on that in giving an 
opening statement.  After my opening statement the judge changed 
his mind, the way I look at it."  The prosecutor stated that he 
informed the law clerk that he wanted the Chief Justice to issue 
a stay of the proceedings so that he could file a writ of 
prohibition. 
 Still at sidebar, the trial judge stated that he did 
not change his ruling regarding the tape, but that he had "been 
directed by the Chief Justice to let it in."  Discussion of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
talk to the Chief Justice during the noon recess, at which time 
the Chief Justice allegedly relayed what he was told by the 
prosecutor and why he responded the way he did.  When defense 
counsel asked him how he could do so without defense counsel's 
participation, the Chief Justice allegedly replied, "That was 
wrong."  The conversation then came to an end. 
 
 These alleged facts are not material to the issue of 
the violation of Yohn's rights.  In addition, apparently they 
were not proffered to the district court.  Thus, we have no 
occasion to consider them. 
15 
telephone call was completed with defense counsel stating that he 
understood the trial judge to be "in disagreement with the 
admissibility of the tape but feels [he] is under a directive of 
the Chief Justice," to which the judge replied, "Correct." 
Defense counsel then requested a stay for purposes of seeking 
review of the Chief Justice's order by the full supreme court; 
the request was denied.    
 The jurors were then brought into the courtroom.  The 
court told them that it had now been decided that they were going 
to hear the tape of the wiretap.  The jurors were also told that 
the tape was thirty minutes long, and that their attention was 
going to be directed to approximately two minutes of the 
conversation.  They were informed that the prosecutor had 
prepared a transcript covering the two minutes of conversation at 
issue.  The jurors were instructed not to regard the transcript 
as evidence, but to consider it as an aid to assist them in 
following the taped conversation.  They were told that the 
transcript would be collected immediately after the tape 
concluded.  The prosecutor then reopened his case, and the tape 
was admitted. 
 On November 5, 1985, the jury found Yohn guilty of 
felony murder, robbery, conspiracy and related charges.  Timely 
motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment were filed and 
heard before an en banc panel of the Court of Common Pleas of 
Lehigh County on November 3, 1986.  In his motions, Yohn alleged 
that his constitutional rights of due process of law and equal 
protection of the law were violated when the Chief Justice 
16 
intervened in the case.  The motions were denied and on June 13, 
1988, Yohn was sentenced to life imprisonment and a consecutive 
term aggregating five to ten years for the non-merged offenses. 
 Yohn appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 
which affirmed the judgment of the court of common pleas on June 
22, 1989.  Commonwealth v. Yohn, No. 01907 Philadelphia 1988. 
Yohn then filed a petition for allowance of appeal to the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania on July 14, 1989, Commonwealth v. Yohn, No. 
656 E.D. Allocator Docket 1989, with a motion for recusal of the 
Chief Justice.  His main claim, once again, concerned the 
intervention of the Chief Justice during the jury trial.  Three 
and one-half years later, on February 19, 1993, the Supreme Court 
of Pennsylvania issued a per curiam order denying the petition 
for allowance of appeal.  Neither Pennsylvania appellate court 
addressed Yohn's claims that the Chief Justice's interference 
with the trial resulted in violations of his constitutional 
rights. 
 Yohn filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, alleging that the Chief Justice interfered without 
jurisdiction in Yohn's ongoing jury trial by conducting an ex 
parte telephone conversation with the trial judge, in which the 
Chief Justice ordered the trial judge to reverse a discretionary 
ruling to exclude wiretap evidence.  As a direct result of the 
Chief Justice's interference, Yohn claimed, he was denied a fair 
17 
and impartial trial in violation of the fifth, sixth, and 
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution.0  
 Yohn's petition was assigned to a magistrate judge for 
consideration.  In his Report and Recommendation, the magistrate 
judge recommended that the district court grant the petition and 
order Yohn released from prison unless the Commonwealth affords 
him a new trial within one hundred twenty days.  The Commonwealth 
filed timely objections to the Report and Recommendation. 
 The district court issued an order approving the Report 
and Recommendation of the magistrate judge.  In granting Yohn's 
petition, the district court directed that Yohn be released from 
custody unless a new trial was commenced within one hundred 
twenty days from the date of the order.  The court also ordered 
that the new trial be conducted without admission of the tape 
recorded evidence.   
 The Commonwealth appeals to us from the district 
court's order granting the writ. 
 In a habeas corpus proceeding, the district court's 
legal conclusions are subject to plenary review, but factual 
conclusions are subject to review for clear error only.  United 
                                                           
0
 Yohn also alleged in his habeas petition that he was 
denied due process and equal protection under the Constitution as 
a result of the Chief Justice's wrongful intervention in his 
appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.  Yohn contends that the 
Chief Justice originally recused himself from participating in 
Yohn's Petition for Allocatur and then withdrew his recusal, 
intervening to influence other justices to deny allocatur.  This 
claim was raised for the first time in the habeas petition.   
 
 We need not address the merits of this allegation as 
our disposition of the first claim moots this issue. 
18 
States v. Luther, 954 F.2d 910, 911 (3d Cir. 1992).  When, 
however, the district court does not hold an evidentiary hearing 
and engage in independent factfinding and the habeas evidence is 
limited to that contained in the state court record, our review 
of the district court's decision to grant the habeas petition is 
plenary.  McAleese v. Mazurkiewicz, 1 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 645, 126 L.Ed.2d 603 (1993).  Because 
here the district court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing,0 
we will exercise plenary review of the district court's decision 
granting the writ.  
  
II. 
 Criminal defendants in a state court proceeding are 
entitled to federal habeas corpus relief if they show that their 
                                                           
0
 The Commonwealth argued that it was entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing to uncover the true facts.  Our review of the 
entire state court record, including the trial transcripts, shows 
that there are no relevant facts in dispute.  In federal habeas 
corpus proceedings, federal courts are required to hold 
evidentiary hearings only if the state court, after a full 
hearing, has not found the relevant facts through reliable 
evidence.  Smith v. Freeman, 892 F.2d 331, 338 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
 In cases where an evidentiary hearing is not mandatory, 
such as the one before us, the holding of a hearing is left to 
the discretion of the district court.  See, e.g., deVyver v. 
Warden, U.S. Penitentiary, 388 F. Supp. 1213, 1215-16 (M.D. Pa. 
1974) (even though extensive pleadings in the habeas corpus 
proceeding raised some issues of fact, no hearing was necessary 
where such factual issues were not material to the determinative 
questions of law to be decided, and were not relevant to the 
resolution of the case); Tijerina v. Thornburgh, 884 F.2d 861, 
866 (5th Cir. 1989) (hearing is not required where only questions 
of law are involved).  In addition, the Commonwealth made no 
proffer of the anticipated testimony, by way of affidavit or 
pleading.  Thus, we find that the district court did not abuse 
its discretion in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing. 
19 
detention violates the fundamental liberties of the person 
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.  Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 
309, 325-26 (1915).  The fundamental liberty at issue here is the 
right to a fair and impartial trial under the due process clause 
of the fourteenth amendment, and the several provisions of the 
sixth amendment.  "The Constitution guarantees a fair trial 
through the Due process Clauses, but it defines the basic 
elements of a fair trial largely through the several provisions 
of the Sixth Amendment, including the Counsel Clause . . . ."0 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-85 (1984).  The 
essentials of a fair trial were set forth by the Supreme Court in 
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948): 
A person's right to reasonable notice of a 
charge against him, and an opportunity to be 
heard in his defense--a right to his day in 
court--are basic in our system of 
jurisprudence; and these rights include, as a 
minimum, a right to examine the witnesses 
against him, to offer testimony, and to be 
represented by counsel.  [footnote omitted] 
 
 Our ultimate question is whether the Chief Justice's 
involvement in an ongoing jury trial, by conducting an ex parte 
                                                           
0
 The sixth amendment reads as follows: 
 
 In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and 
to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence. 
20 
telephone conversation with the trial judge and the prosecutor 
which resulted in the trial judge reversing an earlier 
discretionary ruling made by the state court to exclude wiretap 
evidence, violated Yohn's right to a fair trial.   
A. 
 A state criminal trial comports with the due process 
requirements of the fourteenth amendment "so long as it includes 
notice, and a hearing, or an opportunity to be heard, before a 
court of competent jurisdiction. . . ."  Moore v. Dempsey, 261 
U.S. 86, 94 (1923) (citing Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. at 326).  We 
turn initially to these three requirements of procedural due 
process to determine if they were met in this case.   
 With respect to the first requirement, adequate notice 
requires disclosure of all the issues to be discussed and 
sufficient time to prepare.  In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33 (1967). 
Yohn was certainly aware that the Commonwealth had contacted the 
Chief Justice to request a stay for the purpose of filing a writ 
of prohibition with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.  The first 
time Yohn had notice that the Commonwealth addressed the merits 
of the admissibility of the tape, however, was after the 
telephone conversation between the Chief Justice, the trial 
judge, and the prosecutor had ended.  Yohn thus had no advance 
notice that the merits of the tape's admissibility would be 
discussed with the Chief Justice.  As a result, he had no time to 
prepare a response to the Commonwealth's de facto "appeal." 
21 
 Because of the ex parte0 nature of the discussion with 
the Chief Justice, Yohn was denied a hearing or an opportunity to 
be heard.  The trial judge and the prosecutor talked to the Chief 
Justice on the only two available telephones.  Thus, Yohn's 
attorney was denied the opportunity to participate in the 
conversation because of the physical constraints of the equipment 
in the judge's chambers.  Moreover, Yohn's counsel was not 
informed that the conversation had turned from the prosecutor's 
request for a stay to a discussion on the merits of admitting the 
tape.  Consequently, Yohn was denied the chance to present an 
argument to support his position that the trial judge's ruling to 
exclude the wiretap evidence should stand. 
 The Commonwealth further contends that since it was not 
error to admit the tape,0 and the conversation with the Chief 
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 Black's Law Dictionary defines "ex parte" proceeding as 
any "judicial or quasi judicial hearing in which only one party 
is heard . . . ."  Black's Law Dictionary 576 (6th ed. 1990). 
 
 Here, only one party, the Commonwealth, had the 
opportunity to participate in the telephone conversation, and the 
subject matter of the phone call went beyond what Yohn's counsel 
expected would be discussed.  In our view, this was clearly an ex 
parte proceeding. 
0
 The Commonwealth points out that both an en banc panel 
of the court of common pleas and the superior court affirmed the 
admission of the tape.  As noted by the district court, however, 
the issue of the tape's admissibility is left to the sound 
discretion of the trial judge, who is in the best position to 
"determine the audibility of the tape and its trustworthiness as 
evidence."  Commonwealth v. Leveille, 289 Pa.Super. at 253-54, 
433 A.2d at 52.   
 
 Because the trial judge in this case, prior to the 
Chief Justice's phone call, exercised his discretion in ruling 
the tape inadmissible, an appellate court would have been 
unlikely to reverse it, especially in light of his findings that 
the tape was inaudible, "an absolute absurdity", and "absolutely 
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Justice merely caused the trial judge to return to his original 
ruling on the admission of the tape,  there was no 
constitutional violation.  This argument, however, ignores the 
basic tenets of procedural due process--notice and a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard.  Due process is not so much concerned 
with the result, but with the procedure followed in reaching that 
result.  Here, Yohn was entitled to have notice that the merits 
of the tape's admissibility were going to be discussed and to 
have an opportunity to present his side of the issue.  The denial 
of these essential elements of procedural due process constitute 
the violation.  The fact that the tape was ultimately admitted 
into evidence does not negate the procedural violations which 
occurred. 
 We turn now to the third element of due process -- that 
the opportunity to be heard occur before a court of competent 
jurisdiction.  This requires an examination of the authority of 
the Chief Justice's involvement to the extent the material facts 
of the telephone conversation are not disputed by the parties.0 
 The jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
originates from Article 5, § 2 of the Pennsylvania Constitution 
(1968).  The general powers of the supreme court are codified at 
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 502 (1978).  This section states: 
The Supreme Court shall have and exercise the 
powers vested in it by the Constitution of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
prejudicial."  But for the intervention of the Chief Justice, the 
tape would have been excluded from evidence, and this ruling 
would most likely have been upheld on appeal. 
0
 We gleaned the relevant, undisputed facts from the 
notes of testimony recorded at Yohn's criminal trial and from 
both counsels' briefs and oral argument before us. 
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Pennsylvania, including the power generally 
to minister justice to all persons and to 
exercise the powers of the court, as fully 
and amply, to all intents and purposes, as 
the justices of the Court of King's Bench, 
Common Pleas and Exchequer, at Westminster, 
or any of them, could or might do on May 22, 
1722.  The Supreme Court shall also have and 
exercise the following powers: 
 
 (1) All powers necessary 
or appropriate in aid of its 
original and appellate jurisdiction 
which are agreeable to the usages 
and principles of law. 
 
 (2) The powers vested in 
it by statute, including the 
provisions of this title. 
 
The "powers" of the supreme court "on May 22, 1722" referred to 
in section 502 are set forth in the historical note to 17 P.S. 
§41 (now repealed).  The Act of 1722 refers to "the said judges, 
or any two of them . . ." in describing the powers of the supreme 
court.  This language is clear that a single justice would not be 
vested with the powers set forth in the Act of 1722 and thus 
could not act alone in exercising the powers conferred to the 
supreme court in section 502.  Section 502 was the law in effect 
at the time of Yohn's trial and subsequent appeals. 
 Our conclusion is reenforced by the language in section 
726, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1978), describing the supreme 
court's jurisdiction in King's Bench matters.  Section 726 
confers to "the Supreme Court" plenary jurisdiction over issues 
of immediate public importance.  Rule 3309 of the Pennsylvania 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann., describes 
the procedure to be followed when one applies for extraordinary 
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relief under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 726.  Again, the rule 
specifically refers to "the Supreme Court" in stating that it may 
grant or deny an application or set it down for argument. 
Pa.R.A.P. 3309(c).  The note to Rule 3309 indicates that the rule 
is derived from 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 502 and 726, and the 
first sentence of Section 1, Article 5 of the Pennsylvania 
Constitution.  Rule 3309 also sets forth the specific procedures 
to be followed in applying for relief under the supreme court's 
King's Bench authority, none of which were followed here.  (We 
detail these procedural infirmities involving Rule 3309 infra at 
p. _____.) 
 Section 721 of Title 42, Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann., sets 
forth the original jurisdiction of "the supreme court."  The 
statute refers to the collective body of the court in stating 
that it has original but not exclusive jurisdiction over habeas 
corpus actions, writs of mandamus or prohibition, and quo 
warranto petitions.  
 Another area over which "the supreme court," as a 
collective body, has jurisdiction is appeals from final orders of 
the common pleas courts.  42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 722 (1980). 
Under section 722, the supreme court has exclusive jurisdiction 
in eight types of cases. 
 The remaining sections which address the jurisdiction 
of the supreme court, sections 723, 724 and 725 of Title 42, Pa. 
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Cons. Stat. Ann., refer to the collective body of "the Supreme 
Court."  None of these sections would apply to this case.0 
 The only instances where the Chief Justice of the 
supreme court is authorized to act singly are specifically 
enumerated in the Pennsylvania Constitution, the statutes, and 
various Rules of Judicial Administration.  The constitutional and 
the statutory duties were thoroughly reviewed in the case of In 
Re:  Subpoena Served by the Pennsylvania Crime Commission on the 
Judicial Inquiry and Review Board, Dated June 7, 1983, Number 
83194, and In Re:  Petition for Enforcement of a Subpoena to the 
Pennsylvania Judicial Inquiry and Review Board, 79 Pa. Commw. 
375, 396-98, 470 A.2d 1048 (1983), aff'd, 512 Pa. 496, 517 A.2d 
949 (1986) (hereinafter "In Re:  Subpoena").  The Chief Justice, 
as distinct from the supreme court as a body, is authorized to 
(1) "preside over the trial of any contested election of the 
Governor, Lieutenant Governor or Attorney General;" (2) "accept a 
request from a common pleas court president judge for the 
designation of a judge from another judicial district to act as 
the election return board when no one within the district is 
eligible;" (3) "select four judges to serve on the Pennsylvania 
Commission on Sentencing;" (4) "appoint a non-judiciary member of 
the Capitol (sic) Preservation Committee;" and, (5) "review and 
approve decisions of the Department of General Services regarding 
the size, character, quantity and method of distribution of 
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 Section 723 involves appeals from the Commonwealth 
Court; section 724 involves the allowance of appeals from the 
superior and the commonwealth courts; and, section 725 involves 
direct appeals from constitutional and judicial agencies. 
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various publications to be printed for use by the `judicial 
department.'"  Id. at 397-98.  In addition to these duties 
described in In Re:  Subpoena, supra, there are other references 
to the Chief Justice in the Pennsylvania Rules of Judicial 
Administration, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann., none of which are 
pertinent here.0   
 Recently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted formal 
written internal operating procedures (IOPs).  The IOPs were 
written to implement Article 5 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, 
Pennsylvania statutes and Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the 
customs and traditions of the court.  I.O.P., Article I.  See 
also Marks and Kaplan, Down the Right Road, 17 Jan. Pa. Law. 21 
(1995).0  Article II, Section D of the IOPs reinforces the duty 
of the collective body of the supreme court to adjudicate matters 
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 For example, Rule 506, authorizes the Chief Justice to 
order a hearing and the attendance of personnel at such hearing 
held to determine compliance with the directives of the 
Administrative Office.  Rule 701 authorizes the Chief Justice to 
assign any consenting retired or former judge and any active 
judge to temporary judicial service on any court upon request by 
the president judge.  Rule 706 sets forth the selection process 
for the Chief Justice, and assignment of the duties of Chief 
Justice in the event that the Chief Justice resigns or is 
temporarily unable to perform his duties.  This rule was 
promulgated pursuant to Article 5, § 10(d) of the Pennsylvania 
Constitution and 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 325.  Title 20, Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5511 gives the Chief Justice the power to 
appoint or authorize a special master in guardianship proceedings 
when so requested by the presiding judge of the common pleas 
court where the action is pending. 
0
 Although the IOPs of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did 
not become effective until October 1, 1994, they codified, to 
some extent, the practices and procedures of the court to date. 
Moreover, the written IOPs validate our previous conclusion that 
the collective body of the supreme court is vested with the power 
to adjudicate matters before it, as distinct from a single 
justice. 
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before it.  Section D states in relevant part:  "The assignment 
of a given matter to a single justice is solely for the 
efficiency of the Court, and neither enhances the power of the 
assigned justice nor diminishes the duty of the remaining 
justices as to its proper disposition." 
 According to the IOPs, the Chief Justice performs the 
following duties:  (1) presides at case conferences following 
oral argument, leads the court's discussion, and calls for a 
tentative vote on the decision in each case; (2) has discretion 
to alter the assignment order in civil and criminal cases to 
achieve equal distribution; (3) assigns the case to an individual 
justice for preparation of a draft opinion (in order of 
seniority); and (4) conducts various activities relative to the 
voting on cases.  I.O.P, Article III, sections B(1) and B(3), 
Article IV, Section A(3). 
 Of particular relevance is Article VI, I.O.P., 
entitled, "Motions, Miscellaneous Petitions and Applications for 
Relief."  This article covers the procedures for handling 
emergency motions, writs of prohibition and motions invoking the 
court's King's Bench powers.  Under this article, the Chief 
Justice is authorized to "prepare memoranda setting forth the 
positions of the parties, and a recommended disposition." I.O.P., 
Art. VI, Section B.  Section B further states that a "vote of the 
majority of those participating is required to implement the 
proposed imposition."  The Chief Justice is also required to 
assign two justices on a monthly rotating basis to review 
emergency petitions, and to publish a calendar of duty 
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assignments.  I.O.P., Art. VI, Section C.  Thus, there are six 
situations in which the Chief Justice may act alone under the 
IOPs. 
 Article VI also sets forth the circumstances under 
which a single justice may rule on a motion.  Section D states: 
"A duty justice may entertain and may grant or deny any request 
for relief which may, under Pa.R.A.P. 123, or 3315 properly be 
sought by motion, except that a single justice may not dismiss or 
otherwise determine an appeal or other proceeding."  I.O.P., Art. 
VI, Section D.0  (Emphasis added.)  We note initially that the 
justice granting or denying relief must be the duty justice. 
There is no indication in this case that the Chief Justice was 
the duty justice on October 31, 1985, or that the prosecutor even 
contacted the prothonotary to determine the name of the duty 
justice on that particular day. 
 Second, an application for relief under Rule 123 of the 
Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure must be made in writing 
with proof of service on all parties.  It must set forth the 
basis for the request and the relief sought.  Any other party has 
fourteen days to file an answer to the application.  Subsection 
(e) allows a single judge of an appellate court to entertain and 
to grant or deny any request for relief so long as the appellate 
court does not require that such applications be acted upon by 
the entire court.  In this case, the Commonwealth's emergency 
motion could have been heard by a single justice if it had been 
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 Pa.R.A.P. 3315 is not applicable here as it involves 
the review of stay orders of the superior or commonwealth courts. 
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(1) made in writing and contained the substantive and procedural 
elements for notice; (2) submitted to the prothonotary for 
docketing and assignment to a duty justice, and (3) contained a 
request for a stay of the proceedings.  Here, the Commonwealth 
did not comply with the requirements of Rule 123.  The prosecutor 
did not contact the prothonotary of the supreme court to notify 
him of the emergency motion.  Critically, the telephone 
conversation exceeded a request for a stay and resulted in an 
"interlocutory appeal."  Such an appeal is not properly sought 
under Rule 123, but should have been made under Rule 1311. 
Article IV, Section D of the IOPs specifically prohibits a single 
justice from dismissing or otherwise determining an appeal.   
 We turn now to the Pennsylvania requirements for the 
filing of an appeal, which here would be viewed as an 
interlocutory appeal.  The Commonwealth concedes that it did not 
comply with the procedural requirements under Pennsylvania law 
for filing an appeal.  Interlocutory appeals by permission are 
governed by 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 702(b) and Pa.R.A.P., Rule 
1311, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.  In order for the Commonwealth to 
appeal an interlocutory order under Rule 1311, the trial court 
must state that its "order involves a controlling question of law 
as to which there is substantial ground for difference of 
opinion, and that an immediate appeal from the order may 
materially advance the ultimate termination of the matter. . . ." 
The trial judge did not issue the required statement in this 
case.  Therefore, the Commonwealth could not pursue an appeal of 
the trial judge's order under Rule 1311. 
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 Rule 301 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate 
Procedure sets forth the requirements for an appealable order. 
Generally, an order of court is not appealable until after it has 
been docketed in the trial court.  Subsection (e) sets forth a 
special procedure for emergency appeals.  Rule 301(e) provides:  
Where the exigency of the case is such as to 
impel an immediate appeal and the party 
intending to appeal an adverse action is 
unable to secure the formal entry of an 
appealable order pursuant to the usual 
procedures, the party may file in the lower 
court and serve a praecipe for entry of an 
adverse order, which action shall constitute 
entry of an appealable order for the purposes 
of these rules.  The interlocutory or final 
nature of the action shall not be affected by 
this subdivision. 
 
Title 42, Pa.R.A.P., Rule 301(e), Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann..  The 
Commonwealth could have filed a praecipe for entry of an adverse 
order with the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County.  Had it 
done so, the Commonwealth would then have possessed an appealable 
order from which an appeal may have been taken as of right under 
Pa.R.A.P., Rule 311(a)(7), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1985).0 
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 The 1992 amendments to Rule 311, Interlocutory Appeals 
as of Right, added the following paragraph: 
 
(d) Commonwealth Appeals in Criminal Cases. 
In a criminal case, under the circumstances 
provided by law, the Commonwealth may take an 
appeal as of right from an order that does 
not end the entire case but where the 
Commonwealth asserts that the order will 
terminate or substantially handicap the 
prosecution. 
 
The 1992 amendment merely codified the decisional law of the 
time.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Saunders, 483 Pa. 29, 394 A.2d 
522 (1978) (Pennsylvania Supreme Court would entertain the 
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 As we stated earlier, Rule 3309 sets forth the 
procedures to be followed in applying for extraordinary relief 
under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 726 (King's Bench powers).  Rule 
3309(a) requires that a written application shall be served on 
the affected persons and on the clerk of court having subject 
matter jurisdiction over the application.  The adverse party has 
fourteen days to file an answer.  Rule 3309(b).  The application 
and answer, if any, are distributed to the supreme court for its 
consideration, which may subsequently grant or deny the 
application or schedule it for oral argument.  Rule 3309(c).  In 
this case, there was no written application for relief filed by 
the Commonwealth.  In addition, both the district court and the 
magistrate judge, relying on Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. 
Jerome, 478 Pa. 484, 387 A.2d 425 (1978), appeal dismissed, 443 
U.S. 913 (1979), found that the extraordinary relief available to 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court under King's Bench jurisdiction 
was not appropriate for exercise in this case.  In Philadelphia 
Newspapers, Inc., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that King's 
Bench jurisdiction is to be invoked sparingly, in matters of 
public importance, and where the petitioner's rights are clearly 
demonstrated by the record.  487 Pa. at 494-95.  We agree with 
the magistrate judge and the district court that the facts of 
this case do not rise to the level of importance needed to invoke 
King's Bench jurisdiction.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Commonwealth's appeal from an interlocutory order where the order 
effectively caused the termination of the prosecution's case or 
substantially impaired the presentation of its case.) 
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 The remaining vehicle for the Commonwealth's appeal was 
the writ of prohibition, over which the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court is vested with original, but not exclusive, jurisdiction.0 
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 721.  The writ of prohibition involves 
a proceeding between an inferior court and a superior court, as a 
result of which the superior court exercises control to prevent 
the inferior court from exceeding the limits of its powers and 
jurisdiction.  Glen Mills School v. Court of Common Pleas of 
Philadelphia County, 513 Pa. 310, 314-15, 520 A.2d 1379, 1381 
(1987) (citing Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co. v. Laird, 360 Pa. 
94, 61 A.2d 426 (1948)); Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Toole, 506 
Pa. 12, 19, 483 A.2d 1339, 1342 (1984).  In Capital Cities Media, 
Chief Justice Nix, writing for the court, stressed that "the writ 
of prohibition is limited in scope to questions of jurisdiction; 
the writ will not lie to correct errors of law."  506 Pa. at 18, 
483 A.2d at 1342.  In the earlier Pennsylvania case on writs of 
prohibition, Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co., supra, the supreme 
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 At trial, the Commonwealth stated that it intended to 
petition the supreme court for a writ of prohibition.  The record 
reveals, however, that the Commonwealth did not do so.   
 
 The appropriate procedure for filing a writ of 
prohibition is contained in Pa.R.A.P., Rule 3307, 42 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann.  Rule 3307 essentially contains the same requirements 
as Rule 3309 regarding extraordinary relief.  In addition, 
Article VI, Section A of the supreme court's IOP, which governs 
applications requesting the original jurisdiction of the supreme 
court, states that "[n]o motions, petitions or applications will 
be considered which were not first filed in the office of the 
prothonotary and thence assigned unless a Rule of Appellate 
Procedure specifies otherwise."  Rule 3307 does not state 
otherwise.  Therefore, the Commonwealth would have to have filed 
a Petition for Writ of Prohibition with the prothonotary first. 
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court stated that a writ of prohibition "will never be granted 
where there is a complete and effective remedy by appeal, 
certiorari, writ of error, injunction, or otherwise."  360 Pa. at 
102, 61 A.2d at 430 (citations omitted).   
 The requirements for granting a writ of prohibition are 
met by satisfying the two-pronged test set forth in Capital 
Cities Media.  506 Pa. at 19-20, 483 A.2d at 1339, 1342-43.  A 
petitioner must show that (1) there is no adequate remedy at law 
which would afford relief, and (2) there is an "extreme necessity 
for the relief requested to secure order and regularity in 
judicial proceedings."  Id.  Under the facts of this case, the 
Commonwealth had another remedy available to it.  As mentioned 
previously, the Commonwealth could have filed a praecipe with the 
Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County for entry of an adverse 
order under Rule 301(e) and a subsequent interlocutory appeal 
under Rule 311(a)(7).  It is unlikely, therefore, that the 
supreme court would have issued a writ of prohibition given the 
availability of this avenue of appeal.0   
 Since there is no authority empowering a single justice 
of the supreme court to intervene in a discretionary ruling of a 
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 Furthermore, the magistrate judge and the district 
court predicted that because the trial court acted within its 
discretion in ruling on the admissibility of the tape, the 
supreme court would not have granted a writ of prohibition.  See 
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 478 Pa. at 494 n.11, 387 A.2d at 
430 n.11 ("[p]rohibition is an extraordinary writ designed to 
assume regularity in judicial proceedings by preventing unlawful 
exercise or abuse of discretion").  The function of the writ "is 
to restrain or prohibit an offending court from continuing its 
unwarranted conduct when continuation threatens imminent harm to 
the individual on whose behalf the writ is issued."  Id. 
(Citations omitted.) 
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trial judge and none of the appropriate appeal mechanisms were 
followed, the Commonwealth's "appeal" was not held before a court 
of competent jurisdiction.  We, therefore, hold that the district 
court did not err in finding that Yohn's constitutional rights to 
procedural due process were violated.   
 We feel constrained to address a contention by the 
Commonwealth that the Chief Justice was merely giving advice to 
the trial judge -- perhaps an expression of collegiality from an 
experienced judge to assist at a difficult moment.  It is 
irrelevant to our decision whether the Chief Justice's remarks 
were intended or received as advice or as a directive.  What is 
relevant is that as a result of the Chief Justice's remarks, the 
trial judge changed his ruling, without according Yohn due 
process of law.  The Constitution does not permit such 
transgressions, irrespective of well-meaning intention. 
   
B. 
 We further conclude that the ex parte conversation 
effectively denied Yohn his sixth amendment right to the 
assistance of counsel.  Unlike our finding in United States ex 
rel. Reed v. Anderson, 461 F.2d 739 (3d Cir. 1972) (court held 
pretrial photographic identification by witnesses did not occur 
at a critical stage of proceedings), the ex parte telephone 
conversation occurred at a "critical stage" of the trial. 
"`Critical stages' are those links in the prosecutorial chain of 
events in which the potential for incrimination inheres or at 
which the opportunity for effective defense must be seized or 
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foregone."  Id. at 742.  The only way Yohn's counsel could have 
effectively defended Yohn's position was to be able to 
participate contemporaneously in the telephone conversation with 
the Chief Justice.  Yohn's counsel was not able to participate, 
and, as a direct result of the Chief Justice's remarks, the trial 
judge changed his ruling. 
 
III. 
 In addition to finding that a constitutional error 
occurred during Yohn's trial, we must also find that the error 
was not harmless in order to grant the habeas relief. 
Constitutional errors have been categorized as one of two types: 
structural error or trial error.  A structural error is a defect 
in the trial mechanism itself, affecting the entire trial 
process, and is per se prejudicial.  Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 
U.S. 279, 309-310 (1991), reh'g denied, 500 U.S. 938 (1991). 
Trial error occurs during the presentation of the case to the 
jury, and may be quantitatively assessed in the context of all 
other evidence.  Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, ___, 113 
S.Ct. 1710, 1717 (1993), reh'g denied, 113 S.Ct. 2951 (1993). 
Thus, trial errors are subject to a harmless error analysis.  Id. 
The constitutional error which occurred during Yohn's trial is of 
the trial type.  Therefore, we will review the violation under 
the harmless error standard. 
 The Supreme Court most recently spoke to the harmless 
error standard in O'Neal v. McAninch, 115 S.Ct. 992, 130 L.Ed.2d 
947 (1995), clarifying two issues involving the standard.  First, 
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the Court discarded the "burden of proof" requirement in favor of 
a judicial inquiry:  "Do I, the judge, think that the error 
substantially influenced the jury's decision?"  Id. at 995.  In 
phrasing this inquiry, the Supreme Court relied on its earlier 
decision in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946). 
Second, the Court made clear that its holding in O'Neal applies 
only in the limited situation in which a judge, after a thorough 
review of the record, remains in "grave doubt" as to the likely 
effect of an error on the jury's verdict.  115 S. Ct. at 994. The 
Court explained that by "grave doubt" it meant that, "in the 
judge's mind, the matter is so evenly balanced that he feels 
himself in a virtual equipoise as to the harmlessness of the 
error."  Id. Further, "[w]hen a federal judge in a habeas 
proceeding is in grave doubt about whether a trial error of 
federal law had `substantial and injurious effect or influence in 
determining the jury's verdict,' that error is not harmless. And, 
the petitioner must win."  Id. 
 Kotteakos still applies to determine whether or not the 
error was harmless.  Id. at 995-96.  There the Court opined that 
when the error relates to the minimum amount of evidence 
necessary to sustain a conviction, so that if eliminated the 
proof would not be legally sufficient, the prejudice is 
substantial.  Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 763-64 n.18.  In addition, 
"[i]f, when all is said and done, the conviction is sure that the 
error did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, 
the verdict and the judgment should stand . . . ."  Id. at 764. 
The crucial inquiry is the impact of the error on the minds of 
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the jurors in the total setting.  Id.  It is thus inappropriate 
to ask whether there was sufficient evidence to support the 
result, apart from the phase of the trial affected by the error. 
Id. at 765.  The correct inquiry is whether the error had a 
substantial influence on the verdict despite sufficient evidence 
to support the result apart from the error.  Id.   
 Framing the harmless error inquiry of Kotteakos in the 
context of Yohn's trial, we must ask whether the admission of the 
wiretap evidence had a substantial and injurious effect or 
influence on the jury's deliberations.  From the trial record, we 
know that the existence of the tape was repeatedly mentioned to 
the jury:  initially, during voir dire, when prospective jurors 
were asked about their beliefs concerning "participant 
monitoring," and later during the opening statements of the 
Commonwealth and Yohn's counsel.  The prosecutor told the jury 
that the tape would show that Yohn incriminated himself in the 
murder of Kollar.  Yohn's counsel told the jury the tape was 
barely audible with gaps in sentences.   
 Certainly the jury was aware of the legal controversy 
with respect to the admissibility of the tape because of the 
numerous sidebar conferences and in camera hearings.  First, the 
trial judge dismissed the jury for the day on October 30, 1985, 
once again to take up the issue of the tape's admissibility.  The 
court told the jury that it had a very important issue to resolve 
and it would take a while.  The next day, the court told the 
jurors that the important issue that the court needed to resolve 
and which necessitated their dismissal the previous day was the 
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admissibility of the tape.  At the request of the prosecutor, the 
judge gave a curative instruction regarding a change in the 
ruling on the tape's admissibility.  The judge told the jurors 
that they were not going to hear the tape, that the Commonwealth 
did not intend to mislead them, and that they should not draw a 
negative inference against Yohn because of the tape.  After the 
intervention of the Chief Justice, the trial judge informed the 
jurors that the tape was now going to be played; they would be 
given a transcript of the two minutes at issue, but they were not 
to regard the transcript as evidence.   The tape was then played 
and the jurors were given a transcript to assist them in 
understanding the tape.  The transcript was collected after the 
tape concluded.0  In his closing arguments, the prosecutor again 
brought up the tape.  He asked the jury to infer that Yohn was 
the shooter by filling in some of the gaps in the tape with his 
own words.  The court stenographer's transcript recorded when the 
tape was played for the jury differs from the prosecutor's 
version to which he referred in his closing argument. 
 Besides the wiretap evidence, the only solid evidence 
incriminating Yohn were the statements and/or testimony of the 
                                                           
0
 The day after the tape was played for the jury, defense 
counsel, at a sidebar conference, brought up the fact that 
excerpts from the transcript of the tape appeared in a newspaper 
article that day.  Apparently, the trial judge admitted showing 
the transcript to a reporter and discussed it with the reporter. 
Because the transcript was not part of the record, Yohn's counsel 
objected, and requested that all of the jurors be polled to 
ascertain whether any of them had read the article in the 
newspaper.  After the jury poll, it was determined that none of 
the jurors had seen the article. 
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co-conspirators, Lynn and Southerland.0  The Commonwealth does 
not dispute the district court's finding that the tape was 
crucial to its case:  the prosecutor needed to have the tape of 
the wiretap played for the jury in order to validate the 
statements of the co-conspirators.0  The credibility of the co-
conspirators was called into question because of their status as 
co-conspirators, and because they entered into a plea bargain 
with the Commonwealth in exchange for their cooperation.0 
Therefore, the wiretap evidence was crucial to the prosecutor's 
case.0  Indeed, because the tape was admitted, Yohn alleges he 
                                                           
0
 In addition to the tape, the Commonwealth offered into 
evidence numerous exhibits consisting of photographs of the 
victim, crime scene, pistols, Yohn's and Southerland's homes; 
ammunition and other shotgun supplies, a 45 cartridge; a 
certificate evidencing Yohn's ownership of a 45 caliber pistol; 
drugs; lab and autopsy reports; statements and the preliminary 
hearing testimony of Donald Lynn; and the statement of Gerald 
Southerland. 
0
 In his testimony at trial as well as in his statements 
to police at the time of his arrest, Lynn implicated himself, 
Yohn and Southerland in the attempted burglary and murder of 
Kollar.  He stated that immediately after he heard the shotgun 
blast, he ran outside and saw Yohn holding a shotgun.  In a 
statement dated March 14, 1985, Southerland told police that Yohn 
was the shooter.  Neither Lynn nor Southerland, however, actually 
saw Yohn shoot Kollar. 
0
 In return for his testimony at trial against Yohn, Lynn 
accepted a plea bargain for third degree murder and attempted 
burglary.  Southerland agreed to wear a body wire to try and 
elicit incriminating statements from Yohn, and in exchange, was 
charged only with burglary, not murder.  Southerland was released 
on his own recognizance, subsequently fled the jurisdiction 
before trial, and thus, was not available to testify.  Over the 
objection of Yohn's counsel, Southerland's March 14, 1985 
statement was admitted into evidence. 
0
 We are surprised by the Commonwealth's argument 
regarding harmless error --  that since the trial judge ruled the 
tape was inaudible, and if it was truly inaudible, then the tape 
could not have added anything to the Commonwealth's case. 
Further, if the tape added nothing to the Commonwealth's case, it 
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was forced to take the stand to attempt to nullify the prejudice 
which resulted from the tape.   
 Applying the Kotteakos standard to these facts we 
conclude that the error was not harmless.  The prejudice began 
when the trial court reversed its preliminary ruling, thus 
excluding the tape.  The jury was left to speculate about what 
was really on the tape.  Then the tape, which the trial judge 
found to be inaudible and highly prejudicial, was played for the 
jury.  Again, the jurors were left to draw their own inferences 
as to the incriminating nature of the taped conversation.  And, 
in case the jury was having trouble deciphering those statements 
on their own, the prosecutor supplied his own incriminating 
interpretation of the tape recording in his closing argument. 
Because of all the controversy over the tape throughout the 
trial, the jury must have believed it was an important piece of 
evidence.  It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that the tape 
substantially influenced the jury's decision.  Thus, the 
constitutional error was not harmless. 
 We are not persuaded by the Commonwealth's attempt to 
analogize the facts of Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 113 S. 
Ct. 1710 (1993) to Yohn's trial.   The Commonwealth likens the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
could not have prejudiced the jury and substantially affected 
their verdict, and thus, the error was harmless.   
 
 The Commonwealth's position here is contrary to the 
very essence of the controversy in the criminal trial which gave 
rise to this appeal.  Further, the Commonwealth was willing to 
seek a writ of prohibition to get the tape admitted into 
evidence, a rather extreme measure for something that the 
Commonwealth now argues would not add anything to its case. 
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references made to the tape during voir dire and opening 
arguments to the state's use in Brecht of petitioner's post-
Miranda silence for impeachment purposes.  The Commonwealth 
argues that, when taken in context, the playing of the tape after 
the jury had already heard from both sides of its existence, and 
its alleged contents, was completely harmless.  Further, the 
Commonwealth contends that it would have been more harmful not to 
have played the tape after the jury had already heard of its 
existence and alleged contents. 
 We disagree with the Commonwealth's analysis.  First, 
the references to the tape occurred at the beginning of the trial 
and weighed on the jurors' minds throughout the trial.  The 
misuse of evidence in Brecht occurred at the end of trial, when 
the petitioner took the stand.  Second, the purpose for 
introducing the tape was to inculpate Yohn, not to impeach his 
credibility.  Finally, it is not sufficiently clear that the 
evidence of guilt against Yohn was weighty as in Brecht.    
 
IV. 
 We turn finally to the appropriateness of the relief 
fashioned by the district court -- the exclusion of the taped 
evidence at retrial.  The federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. 
§2243, directs the federal courts to act "as law and justice 
require" in fashioning habeas relief. 
 While we were not able to find any federal cases 
directly on point, the Court's opinion in Crane v. Kentucky, 476 
U.S. 683 (1986), is instructive.  In Crane, the petitioner sought 
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habeas relief to obtain a new trial and to have admitted at 
retrial, evidence which bore directly on the voluntariness and 
credibility of his confession.  476 U.S. at 686.  The Court 
acknowledged its "traditional reluctance to impose constitutional 
constraints on ordinary evidentiary rulings by state trial 
courts," id. at 689, citing its prior decisions holding that 
trial judges must be given "`wide latitude' to exclude evidence 
that is `repetitive . . ., only marginally relevant,' or poses an 
undue risk of `harassment, prejudice [or] confusion of the 
issues.'"   Id. at 689-90.  Yet, the Court in Crane had little 
difficulty determining on the facts before it that the exclusion 
of the evidence deprived the defendant of a fair trial, and thus, 
ordered the evidence admissible on retrial.  Id. at 690-91.  From 
Crane we learn that under the right set of facts, federal habeas 
courts may fashion a remedy involving an evidentiary ruling which 
normally is reserved for the trial judge. 
 Here, the district court felt that permitting the 
introduction of the tape at retrial "would, in essence, render 
the habeas proceeding a nullity by vindicating Yohn's 
constitutional rights in the abstract while having no practical 
effect."  The district court opined that, "but for the violation, 
Yohn would have been tried without the tape's admission into 
evidence."  While the latter statement is true, we cannot find 
support in either the caselaw or the facts for such a remedy 
here. 
 Discretionary rulings regarding the admissibility of 
evidence are still best left to the province of the trial judge. 
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The underlying basis of this habeas proceeding is Yohn's initial 
motion in limine, questioning the audibility of the tape.  Unlike 
Crane, Yohn was not seeking to admit exculpatory evidence, but 
rather, was attempting to exclude evidence which, he claimed, was 
highly prejudicial.  Yohn questioned the tape's trustworthiness 
and its prejudicial effect on the jury, since the tape was barely 
audible, with substantial gaps in sentences.  The state trial 
judge remains in the best position to make that determination. 
Hopefully, on retrial, the mistakes that were made during the 
first trial will not be repeated.  We are confident that the 
trial judge assigned to Yohn's retrial will deal with this issue 
in a more timely manner to avoid the procedural problems 
encountered the first time.   
 One final matter bears mention.  Earlier in this 
opinion, we quoted at length the exchange chiefly between the 
prosecutor and the trial judge.  Without question, this is the 
most caustic and disrespectful confrontation by a prosecutor this 
court has read.  Despite the resulting difficulties and the 
passage of time, it was clear at oral argument before us that the 
prosecutor had not the slightest remorse for his personal affront 
to the trial judge.  We take this opportunity to remind him of 
his responsibilities as an officer of the court and that 
effective counsel can disagree without being disagreeable. 
 
 
V. 
44 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the 
district court's order granting the Writ of Petition for Habeas 
Corpus, unless the state court affords Yohn a new trial within 
one hundred and twenty days from the date of the final judgment 
of this court.  We will vacate that part of the order which 
directs the exclusion of the tape-recorded evidence upon retrial. 
 
